In many instances protective systems used in nuclear reactors are quasi-redundant systems; each of a number of safety channels feeds a number of independent protective units. A reactor shutdown is initiated if more than a specified number of units are in favour of shut down. The objective is to achieve a very high reliability at a reasonable cost. An analysis is presented to obtain the reliability, failsafe and fail-danger probabilities of a quasiredundant system. Three algorithms are given for: (a) the design of a quasi-redundant system having the maximum reliability subject to a cost constraint, (b) the optimal design satisfying a given reliability level at the minimum cost and (c) the optimal design satisfying a combined safety requirement at the minimum cost. The algorithms are illustrated by way of examples.
Introduction
The major objectives of every design of a reactor protective system is to achieve a low probability of failure to initiate the protective action and a low probability of the occurrence of any spurious protecton action. In most instances, the methods used to achLieve the first objective, cause a deviation from the second one and vice versa1. As a consequence, the design must be "optimal", in the sense that it should involve a compromise between the desired objectives, and satisfy the imposed techno-economical constraints.
To achieve the desired objectives, redundancy is commonly used. The usual type of redundancy is to connect n units so that to obtain a m-out-of-n:G system; the protection action is initiated when a coincidence of m or more unit trips occurs. If m=1, then the probability of a reactor spurious trip is maximum; if m=n, then the probability that the protective system will initiate the protection action is minimum. Thus, the proper selection of m, n will give a compromise between the desired design objectives of the m-out-of-n:G system. In the case of a dynamic redundant system2, this compromise can be achieved by adjusting the frequency of scanning of the redundant units.
This paper presents an analysis of a quasiredundant reactor protective system and develops three algorithms which result in the optimal design of such systems. The quasi-redundant system3, is neither without redundancy nor with parallel redundancy and is shown in Figure 1 (a) to obtain the optimum J, M, K which result in the maximum reliability subject to a cost constraint; (b) to obtain the opt!rn'lm J, M, K in order to achieve a specified level of reliability at minimum cost; and (c) to obtain the optimum J, M, K resulting to a reliability level above a specified one and to a faildanger probability below a specified level, at the minimum cost.
Following the notation given in the next section, the reliability, fail-to-safe and fail-to-danger probabilities of a quasi-redundant system are obtained. computer algorithms to solve the above described problems.
Notation and Assumptions
number of safety channels number of protective units per channel minimum number of votes to initiate the protective action total number of units; N a J.M unit fail-to-safe probability of failure unit fail-to-danger probability of failure channel fail-to-safe probability of failure channel fail-to-danger probability of failure reliability of the protective system fail-to-safe probability of the protective system fail-to-danger probability of the protective system capital cost involved in a channel unit capital cost 
It is,
protective system cost; C(J,M) 
Considering the above two extreme cases, it is reasonable to start with the one which gives the higher reliability and then modify the design until the maximum reliability is obtained. The algorithm is as follows:
Read qcs, qcd, qus, qud, CC, Cu and C. 
6.
Evaluate R(Jmax, 1, k); if R(Jmax, 1, k) < Rmax, then go to step 8a, otherwise go to step 7.
7.
Set Rmax = R(Jmax, 1, k), K2 = k; go to step 5b. 
Specified Reliability at Minimum Cost
The problem posed in this section is to achieve a given reliability Rg, at minimum cost; i.e., it is required to obtain Jopt, Mopt and Kopt such that C(Jopt, Mopt) = min, for R(Jopt, Mopt, Kopt) > Rg (7) (8)
Consider the case of the simplest possible design, i.e., J=1, M=1; if (8) is satisfied, then this is the optimal design since (7) is satisfied. In general (8) will not be satisfied for the case of the simplest design, and therefore the design should be adjusted sytematically until both (7) and (8) are satisfied. Algorithm B is used to obtain the optimal design for the present problem (it includes algorithm A).
Algorithm B
Steps: 0.
Read qcs, qcd, qus, qud, RgV cc, cu.
1.
Set J=1, M=1 and K=1. If R(J, M, K) 2 Rg, then go to step 6; otherwise continue to step te 2a. If cc < cu, then set w = cc; otherwise set w = cu.
b. Set C = cu + CC 3.
Set C+-C + w 4.
Use algorithm A to obtain Jopt' Mopt, Kopt and Rmax. Step: Algorithm B can be easily improved by adding an acceleration parameter in step 3; this will cause C to increase quickly until Rmax > Rg; when Rmax > Rg, the value of C is reset to that of the previous step, and the acceleration parameter is reset to 1. The process terminates when the reliability level is achieved for a cost C(Jopt, Mopt) and it is not achieved for C(Jopt -Mopt) -w.
Combined Safety Requirements
Consider the design of a quasi-redundant protective system satisfying two requirements; for example, let one requirement be to achieve a reliability above a specified level Rg, and the other to achieve a fail-to-danger probability below a specified level Qg. Both 
